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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS

HISTORY, PSYCHOLOGY AND CULTURE: A SET OF CATEGORIES FOR AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

DEDICATION: TO MY DEAR FRIEND, THE LATE HERMAN K. HAEBERLIN. IDEALIST BY NATURE, SCIENTIST BY TRAINING, PHILOSOPHER BY ASPIRATION, HE DWELT AMONG US, PURE AS THE DAY. IT CAN NOT BE THAT HE SHOULD BE NO MORE.

INTRODUCTION

PART I

I

A GLANCE at the history of the sciences readily reveals two ever-recurring processes. On the one hand, certain problems demand consideration again and again, because the facts which underlie them are always there, and with increasing knowledge and insight there becomes necessary a more or less frequent revision, restatement and reconceptualization of these facts. On the other hand, the domain of experience is being constantly subdivided into groups of facts which are being taken care of by one or another special science or branch of a science. Just what part of the data of experience thus falls to the share of a science depends on a multiplicity of factors: social conditions, particular historic settings, individual idiosyncrasy, and the emergence of special methods.

While the two processes noted above flow naturally from the very circumstances involved, and are thus likely to persist in the future as they have in the past, there lurk behind these two modes of intellectual approach certain dangers for scientific progress, dangers not always easy to avoid. Thus it might occur, and indeed has often occurred, that the problems of facts and their interpretations become confused through the emergence of issues of a wholly extraneous order, issues growing out of the fluctuating contents and the mutual relations of the special sciences. As a result of this, overlappings will arise between the domains of two or more sciences,

leading to somewhat distracting variations and discrepancies in the treatment of identical facts. Again, gaps may appear in the treatment, in so far as all of the sciences concerned may for common or disparate reasons shirk the task of attending to certain aspects of the facts. But a still further danger, more serious than either of the two mentioned, lies in the possibility that the theoretical problems involved, those of systematization and conceptualization, may become confused, matters of pure terminology gaining undue prominence, and the entire field of investigation acquiring that character of indefiniteness and futility which is wont to sap enthusiasm and discourage research.

These remarks are applicable to the relatively recent developments in the domain of the facts and the sciences referring to the psychic, the social and the historical. Even the domain of biology is involved, although less markedly so. Discussions of the proper contents and limits of the different sciences have gained undue prominence, leading, as might be expected, to vast differences of opinion. There is no agreement, for instance, as to what is to be regarded the proper domain and method of history. The history of an Edward Meyer, with its ideal of a quasi-mechanical recorder of chronologized facts and events, is not the subjectively sensed and artistically transformed history of a Ranke, nor are either like the discriminatingly psychologized and harmoniously ordered history of a Lamprecht. As a fact, this discrepancy in method and ideology is interesting and instructive, but as a basis for acrimonious discussions as to the proper field, method, and purpose of history, it becomes futile and distracting. Similarly in sociology, an ever-popular topic is the content, scope, and limits of the science. Thus, according to some sociologists, their science constitutes the fundamental theoretical basis of social phenomena, while others see in it the sum-total of all social sciences, and still others regard as its proper domain the investigation of a particular social process, namely that of socialization. Psychology, again, after a long career as an analytical science relying essentially on introspection for its concrete material and restricting its scope in the main to the study of the individual, has, on the one hand, come to embrace ever-increasing portions of the social field, and, on the other hand, lured by the attractive results of experimental technique and statistical rigor, has gradually turned its back on the subjective side of its one-time material, until, in the most extreme forms of behaviorism, the science of the mind aspires to reach higher rank as a science by denying the relevancy of mind as such, while grudgingly accepting its very existence.

The situation being as presented, it seems hazardous to venture a

discussion of our subject,—the relations of history, psychology, and culture,—on the basis of one or the other of the accepted conceptions as to the content, scope and method of the sciences of the mind and of society. Instead, it might prove illuminating to turn to the facts themselves, and, disregarding the differentiations of the special sciences, to attempt an analytical conceptualization of the relations of such facts.

II

An examination of a set of social data, as presented by the historic record or by modern conditions, naturally leads to three questions: What kind of data are they? How are they related to one another in time? And what is the connection between them? This suggests three standpoints from which the data can be envisaged: the standpoint of *level* results in two sets of data, objective and psychological; the standpoint of *time* gives another two sets, successive (or historical, in the narrowest sense) and contemporaneous (or coexistential) data; and still another two sets are contributed by the standpoint of connection or *linkage:* the deterministic and the accidental. To represent this grouping of the data in tabular form:

Level	Objective.
	Psychological.
Time	Historical (Successive).
	Contemporaneous (Coexistential).
Linkage	Deterministic.
	Accidental.

All of these terms allow of multiple interpretation and have been used with varying connotations in different sciences or even by different writers. Hence, the terms must be defined for the purposes of the following discussion. The terms then will be given these meanings:

Objective = external (non-psychological), describable in terms of outward behavior.

Psychological = in the psychic level, referring to processes which occur in minds (whether the individual or the social aspect is stressed is in this context irrelevant). *N. B.* "Psychological" does not mean "amenable to the methods of the science of psychology," or anything else of that sort.

Historical = chronologically successive.

Contemporaneous = chronologically coexistential.

Before the last two concepts, deterministic and accidental, can be

defined, a subsidiary concept must be introduced, that of a *system*. In a cosmic sense, every event, whether physical, psychic, or social, is absolutely determined: its character, and the time and place of its occurrence are inevitably fixed by the immediately antecedent events. In a cosmic sense, then, no event is accidental (undetermined or partially determined). Moreover, every event is in innumerable ways linked with all contemporaneous and all antecedent events. This, however, is nothing but an expression of our positive or naturalistic philosophy: permit one event to run amuck, and the entire Universe runs with it.[1] A radically different attitude must be assumed, when any particular set of events is being examined from the standpoint of their connection or linkage. We have long been accustomed, even when the events in question belong to the physical order, to disregard certain connections of such events. If the connections do not count from the standpoint of the issues involved in the set of events under examination (the system), we disregard them: they are not significant. The following may serve as an illustration. I drop my pen. The resulting vibrations are communicated through the table to the floor, the walls, the earth. They reach Europe and are imparted to a French gun which at that moment is being fired at a German target. The aim of the gun is changed, and the projectile will hit the target at a spot removed by an infinitesimal fraction of an inch from that which would have been hit had the vibrations not taken place, had the pen not been dropped by the writer. Now, if we are concerned with the system gun-aim-shot-hit-explosion-damage-to-target, we shall completely disregard the vibrations resulting from the dropping of the pen: their effect, while real, is not of slight significance, but of no significance whatsoever. On the other hand, supposing it is true that the shocks accompanying the discharge of the German gun bombarding Paris from a distance of seventy-five miles have been registered by the seismographs of this country in the form of exceedingly small dots. Now, if we are examining the extent of the measurable vibrations caused by the detonation of the monster gun, or the delicacy of the seismographic instruments, or the relations of the vibrations thus caused to those resulting from a distant earthquake, the data are not only real, but in the limits of the system also significant, not relatively but absolutely so, as significant as any other measurable effect of the distant detonations.

This concept of a *system* is of the greatest importance, if we are to estimate properly the deterministic and the accidental factors in

[1] I am aware that other cosmic philosophies are conceivable and have, in fact, been propounded, of which the concept of accident plays an integral part; in connection with the argument in the text, however, it did not seem necessary to refer more specifically to such alternative cosmic philosophies.

the historic process. From the cosmic standpoint, as we have seen, the historic event is no less irrevocably determined as to content, place, and time, than any other kind of event, nor is any event accidental; which is indeed but a necessary negative correlate of the preceding positive assertion. But if the interest centers on a particular historic group, with its own system of specially intimate relations between its elements, then, within the limits of such a system, certain determinisms may also be observed. In the domain of historic phenomena, such determinisms are, as will be shown, never absolute, but relative, limited. These determinisms are really tendencies, the particular aspects of which are co-determined by things or events having their origin in other systems, and the intrusion of which in the first system must, from the point of view of that system, be regarded as accidental.

In the light of the preceding remarks, the two remaining terms can be defined:

Deterministic = more or less definitely determined within a relatively closed system of historic (or cultural) relations. The term as used has no relation to any philosophical view of the Universe.

Accidental = coming into a system *a* from without, from another system *b*; hence, from the point of view of system *a* relatively undetermined and unforeseeable. The term, like the preceding one, has no wider philosophical implications, nor does it mean "uncaused."

Returning now to the six concepts grouped into pairs from the standpoints of level, time, and linkage, it will be observed that the historical and the contemporaneous series are equally distinguishable in the objective and the psychological levels, in the deterministic and the accidental forms of linkage. The result is eight categories, which represent angles of vision for culture and the historic process. The categories are:

1. Objective—Historical.
2. Objective—Contemporaneous
3. Psychological—Historical.
4. Psychological—Contemporaneous.
5. Deterministic—Historical.
6. Deterministic—Contemporaneous.
7. Accidental—Historical.
8. Accidental—Contemporaneous.

Some illustrative and explanatory comments will now be made on each of the above categories.

THE CATEGORIES

III

Objective-Historical Category.—This is history in the narrowest sense, the description or reconstruction of a successive series of past events. The limiting conception of history in this level would be a complete cinematographic and synchronous phonographic record of the past. The consistent social behaviorist would have to be satisfied with such a record, and build his science of society upon it. But fortunately enough no such consistently behavioristic sociologist or historian has as yet made his appearance. As a rule, either a strain of psychological insight or interpretation is surreptitiously permitted to shed its clarifying light on the stately but hollow row of behavioristic facts; or behaviorism is redefined so as to include more or less of the content of the older socio-psychological material. However that may be, the limitations of the purely objective view with reference to the successive series of events appear most clearly in the work of those who have most enthusiastically embraced the standpoint of historical behaviorism. Moreover, they have never lived up to their thesis. Edward Meyer's historic sense has constantly carried him beyond the purely objective narrative he so insistently advocates. As to Ranke, his "*wie es eigentlich gewesen*" is scarcely ever just that, but mostly a highly subjective account with occasional flashes of truly artistic intuitive rendering of an event or an epoch. Graebner, the ethnologist, has gone as far as any one in his advocacy of a purely objective reconstruction of the past, but, as his critics had no difficulty in showing, his method is really most subjective. Moreover, he deals largely with the distribution of objects of material culture to which behaviorism is most applicable, although even here not without distinct reservations.

The objective-successive series of data certainly constitutes a distinct level in the historic record, of special importance in connection with the general conception of culture and with institutionalism,[2] but it is no less patent that even the most complete reconstruction, if comprising none but objective, external, behavioristic data, could at

[2] Those who insist on the social being a phenomenon *sui generis* and on culture being in its nature historical, base their opinion on a real fact. While the content of culture in so far as it counts, lies in the psychological level and can only be understood and interpreted through the attitudes and tendencies in that level, it can not be derived from it nor from the attitudes and tendencies imbedded in it. A psychological interpretation of a culture can explain its content (explanation here standing for interpretative description), but it can not account for it. This is a corollary of the fact that the cultural content is an heritage of the past, and that it is cumulative. This cumulation is an historical and an objective phenomenon.

most constitute but the beginning, not the end of our knowledge of the past.[3]

IV

Objective-Contemporaneous Category.—It comprises a series of objective coexistential facts and events. Any non-psychological record of pure enumeration, classification, representation, belongs to this category, such as a Who's Who, a city directory, a census, catalogues, photographs, maps, archives, codes, *etc.* The static series is supplemented by a dynamic series, which tells us what people do, what are their occupations, gatherings, feasts, ceremonies, lynchings, congresses, investigations, commissions, legal differences. It will again be noticed that here also it proves difficult to remain within the level of the purely objective, if a satisfactory record is desired. The domain of facts comprised in the above series, one static, one dynamic, will readily be recognized as the province of statistics. The lure of mathematical representation, with its highly creditable scientific pedigree, has doubtless had a great deal to do with the persistent effort to eliminate the psychological categories from the social field of investigation, and thus through the application of statistics, to reduce the study of society to a science. It is, however, a fact too well recognized to require specific illustration, that statistics, on its objective and mathematical side, presents at best but a rearrangement of the data. The data, thus marshalled, can not in themselves provide a solution to any social problem: they merely constitute a problem. In fact, the most signal merit of statistics consists perhaps in the very aptitude of that method to bring to the surface problems which otherwise might never be recognized. But the solution of such problems can only be reached within the level to which the data themselves belong, and thus falls to the lot of the sciences representing the conceptualizations of the particular set of data, whether this be biology, or psychology, or sociology. There is thus good common sense in the popular saying that statistics can be made to prove anything, implying that it is the interpretation of the statistical mate-

[3] This theoretical standpoint can be given the following drastic formulation: Suppose the objective historic past were laid bare; it would then present no more than the material for the study of history (in the wider sense, and of culture. From the standpoint of methodology, however, the case for the objective record, especially in the domain of ethnology, stands much worse than is here hypothetically assumed as possible, for that record is full of gaps, which can only be filled by more or less speculative reconstruction, while the ethnological or cultural perspective for such reconstructions can only be achieved through the study of existing cultures in their totality, that is, including the interpretative illumination derived from the psychological level. Not to have realized this is perhaps Graebner's chief methodological error. (See his *Methode der Ethnologie.*)

rial which counts, and that, if the interpretation is arbitrary, the mathematical garb of the data is no guarantee of truth.

In the field of ethnology, Graebner has repeatedly made use of the objective-contemporaneous category in the stiff catalogues of objects and acts which, like dismembered bodies without joints or souls, constitute his culture areas. Clark Wissler, on the other hand, in his works on the culture of the Plains Indians, has illustrated convincingly the importance of the interrelations and interpretations of culture traits for an adequate characterization of an area. This achievement is the more conspicuous as the author, in a later work of a more ambitious character,[4] returns to the catalogue method of culture depiction, with the inevitable accompaniment of a hollow Graebnerian twang.

V

Psychological-Historical Category.—Perhaps no set of cultural facts has received so much attention at the hands of students of history, culture historians, sociologists, and anthropologists as the successive series in the psychological level.

In the course of the recent discussions of the problems of diffusion of culture, the psychological setting has come in for its share of analysis. The mere statement that an object, belief, or institution has traveled from one tribe or nation to another gives but an inkling of what has occurred. The method of diffusion, the degree and rapidity of assimilation, are problems which inevitably introduce the psychological factor. When W. H. R. Rivers rightly observes that the very fact of contact of two cultures will often create a cultural feature which did not previously exist in either group, he puts his finger on a psychological element. When Paul Radin analyzes the peyote cult of the Winnebago Indians and points out how certain elements of Christian teaching and ritual were taken over whole, without undergoing much transformation, how certain other elements from the same source were changed beyond recognition through the reaction of the Indian ritualistic *milieu,* how still other Christian elements precipitated constructive shifts in the Indian rite and dogma, the author deals with psychological factors. The entire domain of culture history proper belongs here. Every attempt to reconstruct the history of art, literature, religion, philosophy, science, social movements, must deal largely with facts belonging to this category. All the volumes of Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie* as well as his *Elemente,* the latter perhaps contrary to his own intention, contain hosts of suggestive analyses of the historical-psychological series. Clearly also, the very basic principles underlying Wundt's

[4] *The American Indian,* New York, 1917.

conception of the psychic and the social belong here. I mean the principle of the heterogeny of ends and that of the mutation of motives, which are but aspects of the wider principle, that of creative synthesis. While this author must be given credit for an incisive formulation and systematic elaboration of the above principle, the idea of the transvaluation of psychic values in history has, in its wider aspects, anteceded Wundt, and persists without bearing to any marked degree the stamp of the master's powerful influence. Illustrations in abundance await the one who would review the psychological connotations assumed in the course of the last few centuries by such concepts as kingship, liberty, manual labor, riches, drama, learning, heresy, efficiency, asceticism, purity, heroism. An interesting concept recently introduced into ethnology refers to facts of the psychological-historical category. I mean the concept of convergence. When two or more developmental processes which starting from disparate origins and proceeding along unlike but less discrepant paths result, at the final stage or at a point of cross-section, in cultural conditions or features that are comparable or at times even highly similar, the processes are designed as convergent. Although the concept of convergence may also be applied to purely material processes, with almost complete elimination of psychological elements, by far the more useful and significant application of the concept implies factors of the psychological-historical category, where the similarities in the final stages of the developmental processes involved are brought about through a gradual or even more or less sudden transvaluation of psychic values.[5]

It must be submitted without reservations that no interpretation of the historic process is possible, eschewing the facts of the psychological-historical category.

VI

Psychological-Contemporaneous Category.—The artificiality and dryness of a culture characterization based on pure enumeration of objective features has been commented upon before. In reality the different aspects or features of a culture are interrelated. The level of these interrelations is psychological, or psycho-sociological; what else, indeed, should it be? It is generally recognized,—except, perhaps, by the extreme behaviorist,—that it is the links between the different traits of a culture which constitute it an organic integer, not a mere aggregate of disparate traits. The concept of the so-called "cultural setting" belongs to this category. With refer-

[5] *Cf.* the writer's "The Principle of Limited Possibilities in the Development of Culture," *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, Vol. 26, 1913, especially the section on "The Limitation of Possibilities and Convergence," pp. 270–280.

ence to any particular culture the content of the concept is a fluctuating one: any trait may be placed in the center of attention, and the rest of the culture will then, with reference to that trait, appear as an interpretative setting, the traits most intimately related to the one under examination standing in the foreground and practically determining its cultural orientation, while the other, less closely associated traits remain in the more or less negligible background or fringe. When another trait is of major interest, the cultural setting will thus to some extent be different; but it always belongs to the psychological-coexistential level.

Again, a culture, if of any complexity, and to some extent *any* culture, comprises groups of individuals each of which groups is, as a carrier of the culture, deeply saturated with a more or less limited set of its constituent elements, is superficially colored by some others, and remains wholly out of touch with still others. In all cultures of great complexity, such as are presented by modern civilizations or by those of the Ancient World, the latter category of constituent cultural elements is, with reference to any particular group of individuals, exceedingly large. If Lévy-Bruhl's concept of participation in its most general sense is introduced here, every culture will be seen to comprise a complex of mutually overlapping cycles of participation. The links holding together the elements of a cycle as well as the links between interrelated cycles belong to the psychological-coexistential level.

What one is wont to designate as the knowledge or understanding of a culture refers to facts and relations of this level. With reference to historic civilizations, but particularly the modern ones, our understanding along the lines suggested is of a high order, justifying even prediction, although perhaps not to the degree that might be inferred from the frequency of attempts in that direction. In the domain of primitive civilizations, on the other hand, the depth of our penetration is usually most insignificant, the reason being paucity of relevant psychological material, such as prolonged residence among a people and thorough familiarity with the language would supply, or at least, make possible. How many ethnologists, for example, would undertake to specify any number of phrases or situations that would in a particular primitive community be regarded as humorous, as a joke? This has been done in some instances, but their number is small.

Two types of attitudes, both belonging to the psychological-coexistential category, have at times been confused, while their precise relations to the category and to culture in general have often been misunderstood. I mean, on the one hand, the attitudes we have designated as the "cultural setting," on the other, what is known

among ethnologists as "secondary explanations." While the former comprise the psychological rationale of the culture of a group, the expression in psychological (or psycho-sociological) terms of the separate cultural traits as well as their inter-relations, the latter represent deliberate attempts on the part of the individuals of a group to furnish off-hand psychological or even historical interpretations of various features in their own culture. The significance of the concept of "cultural setting" has been commented upon above, as to "secondary explanations," while they present a cultural interest of their own, in so far as the study of them may throw interesting side-lights on the psychological attitudes of the group, contain also two other elements, that of naïve popular psychologizing and that of quasi-historical references which are contrary to fact. The social behaviorist in his more savage than discriminating attacks on the psycho-sociological interpreter of culture has often confused the conceptualizations involved in the "cultural setting" with the misleading psychological and historical vagaries of "secondary explanations."

A. A. GOLDENWEISER.

Continued.

POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY AND POETRY

THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE WORLD AFTER THE WAR

THE world after the war is going to need farmers and mechanics, architects and engineers, doctors and teachers, miners and mathematicians, and men of a hundred other trades and callings. Is is going to have any use for the philosopher? Or must the philosopher await a later and serener epoch of history in which to renew his cogitations upon the mystery of existence? As I put the question, there floats into my mind an odd image out of a story that I heard or read (for the life of me I can not remember where) years ago.

It is the image of a dwelling house, still uncapsized, whirling and plunging on the swollen surface of a flooded river. At a table in the attic of the house, unconscious that it has been torn from its foundation, sits a learned man, pen in hand, reflecting. On the table before him lies a sheet of paper to which at intervals he transfers his thoughts, a sheet which, in due season, will make one more in a high pile of similar manuscript at his left hand—the labor of a lifetime. But the learned man is not alone in the doomed house. Below in the kitchen is his wife, washing his shirt; and because her

work is work that she has done hundreds of times before she does it with her hands alone, her mind in the meantime running off into memories of early hopes that did not come true and dim wonderings as to whether, somewhere, in Spain or Heaven, the future may not have in store compensation for all she has lost. (And she goes and reads a verse from the Revelation of St. John the Divine and wipes a tear with her apron from her eye.) Thus, lost in reverie, she too remains unconscious of the catastrophe that has befallen the house, or, more concretely, of the fact that her husband will never have occasion to wear the garment she is rubbing to such an immaculate whiteness.

Now this story, or glimpse into a story—though I never realized it before—is a prophecy of our own society caught in the convulsion of forces over which it has no control. Indeed, as one thinks it over, it is astonishing to see how many aspects of life at the outbreak of the war it symbolizes. So regarded, not the least interesting question it suggests is whether the unconsciousness of reality and consequent unpreparedness of the learned man and his wife for what was coming were due to their living too wide or too narrow a life. At first thought it would seem as if the man were living too wide and his wife too narrow a life. Because his thoughts had wandered into the realm of cosmic floods and currents, a region where tides are so mighty that they pick up a solar system as a spring freshet picks up a chip, he forgot to notice the relatively tiny terrestrial flood outside his window. Because his wife was bent over her little world of water in a tub, she forgot to notice the vast world of water that was lifting the house in which she dwelt as easily as she could lift a bucket. All this is true. But the reverse of it is equally true. The learned man was in too small as well as in too large a world. Because he inhabited a realm bounded by his inkstand and his manuscript and his shelf of books, or at most by the four walls of his attic, he lost account of the fact that there was a larger world outside his door—for even he was not so absent-minded that if he had gone out to do his reflecting under the open sky he could have remained oblivious of rains and rising waters. Nor does the fact that his wife's world was so little explain, by itself, her unconsciousness of the flood. If her fancy had not journeyed into a far past, or to some romantic realm created by her disappointments, or to heaven, all the laundry work in the world would not have blinded her to what was happening. And so, singularly different as the cases of husband and wife were, they were yet the same: each was living at one and the same time a life too bounded and another life too infinite. I can not remember the end of their story. But it was certainly tragic. If, in some other world, that learned man and his wife get the chance to try

life again, they will surely endeavor to steer a happier course between the Scylla of the cosmic and the Charybdis of the domestic.

Unlike the learned man and his wife, humanity after the war is going to have a chance to try life once more right here on this earth. And if it is to profit by its experience it must bring to a swift end the divorce that now exists between its practical and its intellectual life, the most mischievous of all the absurd divisions of labor that have cursed and wrecked our present civilization. Never again must the thinking of the world be entrusted to men who are only thinkers. Never again must its drudgery be done by men who are only drudges. The world, in a word, must banish speculation from its garret and slavery from its kitchen. They are correlative evils. Henceforth labor must be illuminated by knowledge and thought vitalized by contact with practise. The attic thinker is an anachronism. He was the product of an abnormal economic and social relationship with his fellow men. Whether a member of a privileged class, or dedicated to poverty, or endowed by a monastery, or a patron, or a school, his was an existence of abnormal isolation and insulation from the details of the workaday world. The day of the metaphysician is done—the metaphysician in the sense of the man who, standing apart from life, seeks to see it in its entirety, or, like a spider, to spin out of his brain a self-consistent explanation of its mystery. But the day of the philosopher is only dawning—the man who descends into life, seeking contact with its variety, experience from its manifoldness, trying it at all its critical points, in the hope and faith that out of its diversities and discords a harmony may be created. For this type of man the world after the war is going to have literally a terrible need.

Yet what a task lies before him!

Look out on contemporary life, and even apart from the tumult of the war, what a chaos it presents! What does it all mean? Whither is it driving? To what wonderful thing is it blindly striving to give birth? Out of a thousand tendencies and interests, set down a score at random: syndicalism and psychical research, prison reform and proportional representation, Freudian psychology and free trade, scientific management and academic freedom, Gary schools and guild socialism, kultur and theosophy, the kindergarten and the single tax, anarchism and the gold standard, baseball and birth control. What a welter, apparently, of cross currents and counter purposes! Of any one of them, or a hundred others, there is no lack of men and women to speak authoritatively: to discourse on the evils of secret diplomacy or the necessity of sex education, on the inheritance of acquired characteristics or the spread of neurasthenia, on the future of Africa or the future of the aeroplane, on free verse,

or the League to Enforce Peace, or Christian Science, or conscription, or the negro question, or the revival of Greek, or osteopathy, or prohibition, or the servant problem, or the superman. But who is there to speak of all of them together: to grasp their secret interplay, to recognize their combined potentialities, to elicit their hidden harmonies, to perceive the design that their many-colored strands are weaving—or might be made to weave? No one, doubtless. The task is too gigantic for a single human brain. And yet there are men to whom it will stand as a perpetual challege to intellectual combat, who will attack it again and yet again, and who will not be wholly defeated by it. Such men—whether they are thinkers who have descended into life or workers whose labor has been illumined by thought—are philosophers. Their problem, compared with that of the metaphysicians of the past, is as the conduct of a modern battle to a game of checkers. The world after the war will have need of the tactical victories of its farmers and mechanics, its miners and engineers. But as never before the world will cry out for the philosopher (though she will not call him by that name), for the philosopher is the strategist of the future.

Skakespeare and Philosophy

"THE real world is the world of Shakspere and Plutarch." That, declared William James, shortly before his death, is what philosophy "has ended by saying to *me* more and more."

Far from having come to the same conclusion, there are plenty of people to-day, who, reacting against the idolatry of England's great dramatist that prevailed throughout the nineteenth century, are ready to prove that Shakespeare is obsolete. On the stage his plays may still afford a tolerable sort of entertainment, they admit. His verse may still charm the ear. But for serious purposes his world is out of date. One school of critics disposes of that world by declaring that it is the world of Feudalism. Another by showing that it is the world of Humanism. A third by insisting that it presents no clear-cut philosophy of life. Under any of these counts, or several others, the poet is found guilty. He is an aristocrat; our problem is the problem of democracy. He is an individualist; our task is the task of collectivism. He is interested merely in presenting life; what we need above all things is a philosophy to guide it. In the light of these statements, especially the last one, it is arresting to find one of the very profoundest of recent thinkers—a man of keen democratic sympathies and creative social vision, a man to whom philosophy was a passion—asserting that philosophy had ended by saying to him that "the real world is the world of Shaks-

pere." Those words of William James may well give pause to any one who is preparing to inter William Shakespeare.

Now there needs no critic come from the grave of Shakespeare to tell us that the three centuries since his death have brought social, industrial, and economic changes of which not even the poet's imagination could have dreamt. The face of the world is altered. Its immediate task is altered, too. The task of Shakespeare was to grasp and interpret the breakup of medievalism, to express creatively that great liberation and expansion of life that we call the Renaissance. Our task is to evoke a new unity out of that life. But it does not follow, because the appearance and work of the world are changed since Shakespeare's time, that its heart and soul are different also. On the contrary, as William James divined, its deepest realities remain the same. Granted that Shakespeare can throw no immediate light on a hundred of our practical problems; it is still not too much to say that we shall succeed or fail in our work of framing a new international civilization according as we do it, or fail to do it, in the Shakespearian spirit.

Civilization is constantly trying to see how much of life it can unify. It is easy to have a great deal of life if you leave out the unity; and it is easy to have a great deal of unity if you leave out the life; the thing that is hard is to have them both together. All the great unifications of the past have been achieved at the price of life's variety. That of Rome was. That of the Catholic Church was. That of Prussia, if Prussia had succeeded in putting the world at her feet, would have been. But Prussia did not succeed, for the world is getting tired of achieving its freedom by the process of changing the name of its slavery. Power to bring order out of chaos is a god-like power; but the task of unifying the world will never be carried through triumphantly until to the passion for order is added the belief that life has not one end, but many ends; that every genuine experiment in human living is sacred—to be protected, encouraged, understood, and to be judged only by its hostility or helpfulness to the rest of life; that the only truth entitled to say to another truth, "I am truer than you," is the truth that can include and take up that other truth into itself. This attitude may be better described as a spirit than as a belief. And to the secret of this spirit there is no better guide than Shakespeare.

It is this spirit that is variously called his myriad-mindedness, his universality, his objectivity, his impersonality, his tolerance, his "mercy"—and it is this too that is supposed to constitute his lack of philosophy! It is this spirit in his works that enables men, according to their predilections, to prove to their complete satisfaction that Shakespeare was a Catholic or a Protestant, a radical or a con-

servative, an aristocrat or a democrat, a materialist or an idealist, an atheist or a Christian—never perceiving that the poet was one of those who saw that life is altogether too subtle and complex to be caught within even the most skilful formulæ of human thinking. Upon this attitude Shakespeare of course had no monopoly. In varying measure, it is the spirit of all poetry. It is the creative spirit. It is the spirit that desires life, and desires it more abundantly. It is the spirit that says "Judge not." Only superficial minds think that to say "judge not" is to say "let there be no judgment." Shakespeare could pass from pole to pole—from "Timon" to "The Tempest," and from "A Midsummer-Night's Dream" to "King Lear." Yet of no poet who ever wrote are we more certain what he loved and what he hated. The distinction is that where the doctrinaire spirit, the fanatic spirit, the party spirit, or the ordinary prejudiced human spirit, justifies this kind of life and condemns that, the creative spirit leaves life free to justify or condemn itself. They who aspire to shape a world-state must learn the secret of doing exactly that. The military spirit, the legal spirit, the imperialistic spirit, the institutional religious spirit—these may impose themselves on life and succeed in welding vast masses of humanity into this or that marvellous machine. But it is only the creative spirit that can elicit from life those cohesive and harmonizing forces with power to preserve its variety and touch it at the same time into a living organism. This is the real pacifism. Upon it the reconciliation of socialism and liberty, of internationalism and democracy, depends.

Shakespeare's very lack of philosophy, then, turns out to be a philosophy—a philosophy, moreover, that has striking resemblances to certain developments of modern thought. For Shakespeare the human world is what individual men make it; they make it many different and contradictory things at the same time; those things must be judged by the joys or the wounds that they produce; and any unity or promise of unity in that world seems, not like the nice adjustment to one another of the parts of a machine, but like the harmony in variety of the flowers in a garden or the instruments in an orchestra. Now no one even slightly acquainted with recent philosophy needs to be told that these are precisely the conclusions arrived at by the author of *The Will to Believe, Pragmatism,* and *A Pluralistic Universe,* and they serve to explain what William James meant by declaring that philosophy had ended by saying to him: "The real world is the world of Shakepere and Plutarch, in which men live out their several businesses." Nor it is a coincidence, I think, that this pluralistic, creative philosophy of James, Dewey, and others has come out of America—America that is seeking to solve not

merely its original democratic problem, but to find a harmonious working basis for a score of nationalities and cultures. And now the war makes us realize, if we did not realize it before, that on a vaster scale the American problem is the world problem. Orient and Occident, Slav and Teuton, black and white, all races and religions, all colors and customs, must be—not fused in a melting-pot—but composed into a symphony. Surely for such a task the world must seek counsel from its supreme composers. And one of these, as the author of *A Pluralistic Universe* reminds us, is William Shakespeare.

If Shakespeare has this significance for the twentieth century, it is proper to ask whether he is being taught so as to bring it out. If we were to judge from college catalogues and the publications of scholars and teachers, we should be led to infer that the burning Shakespearian questions may be divided into three classes: (1) the poet's linguistic usages and the state of his text; (2) his sources and his relation to contemporary dramatists; (3) his technique as a playwright and the allied question of the construction of the Elizabethan stage. These problems have their place. But in the name of sanity is it not time to have done with the teaching of Shakespeare as if every student were to become a Shakespearian specialist? We have spent some decades in trying to determine what Shakespeare meant to Shakespeare's contemporaries. Is it not about time to begin finding out what Shakespeare means to us? For the two things, necessarily, are profoundly different. Every age, said Goethe, must seek its own interpretation of *Hamlet*. The same is true of all of Shakespeare's masterpieces—as it is, indeed, of all great works of art. The manglings that Shakespeare's plays underwent during the Restoration and later, like Tate's version of *Lear*, were really less sacrilegious than the attitude of many present-day scholars. The eighteenth-century "adapter" at least treated Shakespeare as if he were alive and honestly tried to express him in the eighteenth-century spirit. The twentieth-century "scholar" would pickle him forever in a jar of Elizabethan spirit. A school-boy would know better. Indeed, the school-boy who blunderingly takes a sixteenth-century word in its modern significance and admires the line for saying someing it never intended to say is really closer to the spirit of poetry and the heart of Shakespeare than is the professor who knows the whole history of the word and gets its precise Elizabethan shading, but who, in his hurry to get on to the next word, hasn't time, if he has the power, to admire anything except his own learning. Such pedantry is at the opposite pole from poetry.

The demand of the hour in this matter is for a social and pragmatic school of Shakespearian critics and teachers who can hear and

report what Shakespeare has to say to the present generation. For that task a first requisite will be an understanding of the relationship of politics, philosophy, and poetry. "There is more of a nation's politics to be gotten out of its poetry," says Woodrow Wilson, "than out of all its systematic writers upon public affairs and constitutions." The function of the philosopher, says William James, is "indistinguishable from that of the best kind of statesman at the present day." Taken together, those two sentences make clear a truth to which our abject slavery to words has long blinded us: that politics, philosophy, and poetry are not separate things, but three forms, rather, of the same quest, three modes of the same activity. Each, in its purity, is a manifestation of the creative spirit. In a liberal society, each will draw nourishment from the other two. Command of these three P's, indeed, is as indispensable for creative leadership in the affairs of civilization as command of the three R's is for the business of everyday life.

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A LIST OF ARTICLES, MOSTLY BOOK REVIEWS, CONTRIBUTED BY CHARLES S. PEIRCE TO "THE NATION" TO WHICH IS APPENDED SOME ADDITIONS TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HIS PUBLISHED WRITINGS IN THIS JOURNAL, DECEMBER 21, 1916

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

A Study in the Philosophy of Bergson. GUSTAVUS WATTS CUNNINGHAM. New York: Longmans Green and Company. 1916. Pp. ix + 212.

Professor Cunningham's voice, as it sounds through the pages of *A Study in the Philosophy of Bergson,* is the voice of the Genteel Tradition in American philosophy. Suave in tone, lucid, grave, eloquent, accomplished, it laments the upgrowth of a generation of unscholarly thinkers; quotes Tennyson and T. H. Green; urges German philosophy on us before everything else; finds fault with James; takes Bergson to task and then sets him right, firmly, not unkindly, as a schoolmaster might some brilliant, but youthful and wayward, disciple. In the course of the book certain problems spring up; such problems as are likely to rise and to tower and ramify above a discussion of any particular point in philosophy whatsoever; nature of knowledge; appearance and reality; *etc., etc.* Professor Cunningham touches on these problems interestingly and significantly. But the center of gravity of his book is outside of any topical problem from the history of philosophy. Primarily he attempts, in his book, to draw certain inferences of constructive intent from the contradiction into which he discovers that the philosophy of Bergson has fallen. Competent critics are agreed that the philosophy of Bergson is stricken, and seriously stricken, with contradiction; but the constructions which they try to put on this contradiction are very diverse. Professor Cunningham's argument in the matter runs as follows:

Like Kant, through whom it is well that Bergson be approached

and apprehended, Bergson declares that the intellect is incapable of acquainting our minds with reality. Intellect is restricted to spatial, quasi-spatial, or mechanical categories; reality, on the other hand, is, or at least it may be, non-mechanical. So Kant; so Bergson. Into this situation, or supposed situation, Bergson invokes a new faculty, intuition, to eke out the inadequate intellect. Intuition, in his sense, employs non-spatial, non-mechanical categories. Bergson's originality, then (if original he be), will stand or will fall with this intuition. But, the doctrine of Hegel demonstrates clearly that Kant was mistaken in restricting the intellect to mechanical categories. Bergson's contradiction is a problem of Hegel *versus* Kant. Truth lay on Hegel's side. In fact, the later of the Critiques of Kant show Kant forced from his earlier position. Similarly, as Bergson proceeds he is forced to allot to the intellect powers he had assigned, in the first place, to intuition alone. Discrepancy in Bergson's accounts of the nature of the intellect, which he sometimes sets over against intuition, and sometimes identifies with intuition itself, is the source of the disconcerting contradictions and confusions that permeate and weaken this philosopher's work.

Such is the nerve of Professor Cunningham's argument, as far as his diagnosis of Bergson's contradiction is concerned. Beyond this diagnosis, and on it in part, he builds up a doctrine of "Creative Finalism," to replace the "Creative Evolution" of Bergson.

The doctrine of Creative Evolution, Professor Cunningham says, is unintelligible and irrational. It is self-contradictory. Bergson's duration is no process, as lacking all homogeneity. If the evolution of the self were heterogeneous purely, as Bergson contends, both psychology and ethics would be inexplicable; nor could any sense of security be enjoyed by philosophers, since nothing would certify the direction that conscious experience might take. According to the hypothesis of Creative Finalism, however, conscious experience is teleological throughout. Certainly the temporal process is genuine. To be real is to change, to change in accordance with ends which themselves change. Reality creates—actually, spontaneously. Nothing static is real. But, of course, there is law in the midst of this transformation; law guaranteeing the future. Reality expresses a determinate principle; reality, throughout evolution, is ever identical with itself. The only past that possesses existence is precisely the past that now exists. That which is, is that which is to be. Being and becoming are one and the same. "Reality is a flux and yet it is static."

With Professor Cunningham's diagnosis of Bergson's contradiction the reviewer finds himself partly in accord. Bergson unques-

tionably alters his definitions of intuition and of intellect, with the result that they sometimes exclude one another, and sometimes overlap in a greater or less degree. Sometimes intellect, in Bergson's account, may employ the mechanical categories only; sometimes it may employ not only mechanical, but other categories as well. The difficulty, however, is that occasionally Bergson forbids the employment of any categories whatever to intellect; or, it might be better to say, to the mind of the philosopher *quâ* philosopher. This general condemnation of conceptual knowledge Professor Cunningham notes, but regards as too skeptical and absurd to be taken very seriously into account. Its absurdity the reviewer would shrink from denying; nevertheless, contradiction is essentially absurd, and the cardinal problem of Bergson's philosophy, from the point of view that Professor Cunningham chooses to adopt, is: what can it be that drives a philosopher of Bergson's calibre into the absurdity of contradicting himself? Is it a fact that Bergson sets out on the course of his philosophizing with a theory of the intellect which, in the sequel, he tends to reject? Professor Cunningham would have it that the contradiction in Bergson's philosophy is one in process of being outlived —a fortuitous or adventitious affair, which might be eliminated from Bergson's doctrine, leaving that philosopher's theory of knowledge, not very much altered, in the form of a respectable epistemology. On the other hand, we seem to discern a contradiction continually generalized as Bergson writes on; a contradiction most striking and significant in the *Introduction to Metaphysics, La Perception du Changement,* and *L'Intuition Philosophique.* It would be possible, moreover, to grant that Bergson's difficulties are, in the final analysis, identical with Kant's, without following Professor Cunningham in his view that Kant's fundamental difficulty resulted from his restriction of the intellect to a particular class of categories. Bergson strikes us as contradicting himself most seriously (and instructively) in the latest of his publications, where he struggles with the general question more explicitly than elsewhere; how can a category—any category—be the instrument of knowledge, seeing that a category appears of necessity to define, restrict, and therefore to vitiate, the vision it conveys of an object? This problem, which comes to be ever more prominent in Bergson's thought, we suppose to have been Kant's fundamental preoccupation in the theory of knowledge, and logically, therefore, the point of contact between Bergson and Kant, rather than any consideration of mechanical or non-mechanical categories.

GEORGE PECKHAM.

NEW YORK CITY.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

MIND. January, 1918. *Analysis of Thinking* (pp. 1–21): W. E. JOHNSON. – Whereas it is commonly assumed that logic and psychology give entirely different treatments of the topic of thinking, the view is here put forward that preliminary treatment of thinking should be precisely the same both as regards substance and detail in both of these studies. The writer then proceeds with such an analysis. *Individuality* (pp. 22–39): CHAS. A. MERCIER. – Defining an individual as "that which is comtemplatible separately from other things, and as unified in its composition," there follows a classification of individuals according to internal constitution into "class" and "whole," and according to external constitution into "substance" and "quality." An analysis of each of these divisions is then given. *Volitional Attention and its Training* (pp. 40–54): C. W. VALENTINE. – Believing in the reality of voluntary attention as a psychological fact, the paper shows that there is a certain amount of truth in the doctrine that a general training of attention is possible, and shows how exactly it may take place. *The Relation between Art and Science* (pp. 56–76): P. J. HUGHESDON. – The view is that "art and science provide complementary and correspondent conceptions of reality." The art-correlation with science is shown with regard to the postulates of science, logic and mathematics, ethics and religion. *A Discussion of Modal Propositions and Propositions of Practise* (pp. 77–85): RAPHAEL DEMOS. – An interpretation of modal propositions and propositions of practise as referring "to no other field than that of the factual world." The latter are interpreted with special reference to the opposing views of Dewey. *Cassandra's Apologia* (pp. 86–91): F. C. S. SHILLER. – A piece of dialectic in the form of a dialogue between Cassandra and Apollo or the nature of truth and falsity. *Discussion: "Activity": A Vital Problem:* E. D. FAWCETT. *Critical Notes:* C. A. Mercier, *On Causation and Belief,* E. E. C. JONES. I. HUSIK, *A History of Medieval Philosophy,* C. C. J. W. M. W. Keatinge, *Studies in Education,* T. P. NUNN. *New Books. Philosophical Periodicals. Notes.*

Cooley, Charles Horton. Social Process. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1918. Pp. 430. $2.00.

NOTES AND NEWS

HERMAN COHEN

THE German newspapers report the death of Herman Cohen, formerly professor of philosophy at Marburg, and head of the Neo-Kantian school of philosophy that is known as the Marburg school.

Born in 1842, Cohen first attracted the attention of the philosophic public by a series of articles in the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie,* 1866–1871. The last of these articles, *Zur Controverse zwischen Trendelenburg und Kuno Fischer,* displayed a strikingly thorough and vigorous grasp of the Kantian philosophy as a method of interpreting experience. This was followed by his book on *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung* (1871) in which the Kantian philosophy was not only vigorously defended but also placed in a new historical light. Instead of correlating it with the British empiricism (Locke-Hume) or Wolffian rationalism, Cohen tried to show that the Kantian philosophy is best understood as concerned with the basis of mathematics and physics as developed by Kepler, Galileo and Newton. He followed this up with *Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik* (1878) and *Das Prinzip der Infinitesimalmethode und seine Geschichte, ein Kapitel zur Grundlegung der Erkenntniskritik* (1883). The historical learning of the latter book has been admired by men like Bertrand Russell, who differ radically from its philosophic position. Cohen also dealt with the two other portions of the Kantian philosophy, ethics and esthetics, in *Kants Begründung der Ethik* (1877) and *Kants Begründung der Æsthetik* (1889). In the latter part of his life, Cohen stated his own independent yet closely Kantian views in his *System der Philosophie* (I., *Logik der Reinen Erkenntnis;* II., *Ethik des Reinen Willens;* and III., *Æsthetik des Reinen Gefühls,* 2v.). Cohen also edited Lange's *Geschichte des Materialismus,* and his introduction and supplements to that book contain clear indications of his attitude to modern scientific and philosophic movements.

Cohen's influence was very extensive. His conception of the history of modern science is shown in Kurd Lasswitz's *Geschichte der Atomistik,* and in Cassirer's history, *Das Erkenntnisproblem, etc.* (1906–1907). His ethical views have largely shaped the juristic philosophy of Stammler and have been applied to the philosophy of history by Münch and Gorland. The volume of *Philosophische Abhandlungen* presented to Cohen on his seventieth birthday (1912) testifies to the wide extent of his philosophic influence—the contributors including men of many nationalities and of divers interests. Many of the younger socialists of Germany have tried to substitute his form of Neo-Kantianism for the Marxian Hegelianism which has been the prevailing basis of official socialism.

Besides his many contributions to philosophy Herman Cohen frequently wrote on questions of Jewish religion and ethics. He was one of the founders of the *Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaft des Judenthums,* and his seventieth birthday was made the occasion of presenting him with a *Festschrift* of Hebrew studies entitled *Judaica.*

M. R. COHEN.

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